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Abstract 
George Spencer Brown is best known for his book Laws of Form, which elaborates a primary 
algebra of distinctions and forms capable of dealing with self-referential equations reflective 
of paradoxes in logic. The book has received little attention in mathematics, but it has greatly 
influenced cybernetics, communications, and ecological theories. But Spencer Brown also 
published poetry and stories, often under different names, and he practiced as a 
psychotherapist. Our chapter elaborates the utility of Laws of Form relating to organizational 
paradox before considering Spencer Brown’s other works in relation to his mathematics. 
Invoking philosophy, psychoanalysis and art, we suggest that these indicate a further 
distinction that sets all forms against the ‘nothing’: a wholeness or unity from out of which 
all distinctions, all words, meaning and life – but also all silence, nonsense and death - 
emerge in paradoxical opposition. Reading Spencer Brown not through the prism of 
mathematics, but as an evocative invitation to engage with the fissures that animate art and 
human life, highlights the paradoxical interplay of organization and violence; and how 
tragedy, suffering, sympathy and love should be more prominent in organizational research.   
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In the book Only Two Can Play This Game, the poet James Keys (1971, p. 50) writes under 
the title ‘An Accident’: 
   
My love, would you not come to me if 
I was wounded? 
Would you not arrive to comfort me if 
I had had a serious accident? 
Well, I have had a serious accident. 
I have been born. 
  
Birth is a serious accident. Life is a wound. The in-dividual cut away from the world at 
birth, made boundedly singular, yet retaining a constant yearning for completeness and unity 
is the paradox running through this collection of poems. Keys is one of the pen-names used by 
George Spencer Brown (1923-2016): hirsute mathematical genius and heir to Euclid,1 
engineer, record-holding pilot of glider airplanes, Royal Airforce reserve officer and code-
breaker, consultant, football correspondent, chess master, composer and editor of a book on 
‘tunes and musical themes,’2 inventor, game creator, racing car driving poet and, reportedly, a 
strange neighbour.3 Working with philosophers Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein at 
Cambridge, Spencer Brown practiced psychotherapy after studying with psychologist R.D. 
Laing. 4 His best-known work, Laws of Form, develops an elegant, non-numerical calculus 
capable of capturing paradoxical states of affairs as unfolding and refolding distinctions, but 
even this remains largely ignored by mathematicians (Schiltz, 2007).5 Perhaps this is no 
surprise, given its insights are conveyed in near mystic, circular expressions (‘we name the 
form of the distinction the form’); the invocation of a trinity (‘what something is, what it is not, 
 
1 “Not since Euclid’s Elements have we seen anything like it” is a quote by Bertrand Russell on the sleeve of 
Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form. But this might very well have been one of many pranks by the eccentric author 
(see Landini, 2018). Stafford Beer suggested Spencer Brown may have been Russell’s ‘natural’ (illegitimate) son 
(even Wittgenstein’s lover whilst at Cambridge) (see V. Beer, 2019), while Spencer Brown (2015, p. vii) himself 
suggests that Russell’s book recommendation was achieved only by Spencer Brown (‘not unwillingly’) sleeping 
with Russell’s granddaughter. 
2 In a piece of simplistic ingenuity, the book identifies a large number of tunes by simple UpDownUpDown and 
Repeat… patterns. ‘Halleljuah!’ from Handel’s Messiah, is thusly coded as: DUDUD UDURR RRRRR. (See 
Crompton, 2019). 
3 For example, he did all his writing naked (Spencer Brown, 2004), and adopted an  increasingly dishevelled look 
in his later years.  
4 A reciprocal relationship, as Baecker (2015a) suggests Laing's 1970 book ‘Knots’ about human relations getting 
entangled in knots appears owes much to Spencer-Brown. 
5 For exceptions, see Kauffman 2016. Instead, reviews appeared in other places, for example by von Förster in 
the final Whole Earth Catalog and by Stafford Beer in Nature.   
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and what separates the two’); and  its elaboration of a mathematical genesis of a universe (space 
and time) out of void. Laws of Form begins with a series of untranslated Chinese characters 
and epigraphs to two different prints of the book feature obscure, anti-establishment references 
to the mystic engraver William Blake.6 All this is accompanied by Spencer Brown’s reported 
rudeness and hostility towards mathematicians, and him claiming, as Keys (1972, p. 32ff), that 
‘in the whole science of physics there is no such thing as a thing’; and that ‘modern science is 
maintained by means of a huge and very powerful magic spell’, putting us all to sleep. Instead, 
of mathematics, Laws of Form influenced second order cybernetics; theories of rhizomes,  
‘living’ systems and ecology (Bateson, 1972; Shaw, 2015); the sociology of social and 
communications systems (Luhmann, 1995); computer languages (Bricken, 2017); and some 
approaches to organizational studies (Bakken, 2014; Baecker, 2015; Reichel, 2017).  
Our chapter elaborates the utility of Laws of Form relating to organizational paradox 
(e.g., Schad et al., 2016; Smith & Lewis, 2011), as it provides mathematical and visual methods 
to work with substantially complex and layered recursive relationships (Baecker, 2006). 
Moreover, we explore Laws of Form in the context of Spencer Brown’s poems and stories, as 
well as his engagement with psychoanalysis. We suggest that these works are not merely 
unscholarly dalliances, but very serious attempts to indicate an even deeper-going divide that 
sets any distinction, inducing Law of Form, against the ‘nothing’: a wholeness or unity from 
out of which all distinctions, all words, meaning and life – but also all silence, nonsense and 
death - emerge in paradoxical opposition.  
We commence with basic elements in Laws of Form and trace their relation to 
organizational paradox through the work of Baecker (2015), himself a student of Luhmann, 
elaborating questions of organizing, management and leadership. We then turn to the ‘nothing’ 
whose ungraspable qualities Spencer Brown invokes through stories and poems. Paving the 
way towards these writings, we develop a vocabulary and sensitivity for the nothing through 
exploration of three inter-related themes: Through Kyoto School philosopher Nishitani, we 
explore existential notions of the nothing. Via Jung we trace how mystical origins of the 
nothing give rise to psychological oppositions; and with Nietzsche show how art –music 
tragedy in particular – invokes the play of form and formlessness. This allows us to engage 
with Spencer Brown’s (and Keys’s) poetry and stories and elaborate implications for 
 
6 One, ‘The form of the Angelic land’, a poem rife with symbolism obscuring a call for revolutionary uprising 
against kings and bishops. The other,‘There is no Natural Religion’, which is worth spelling out because, as we 
will argue, it captures much of Spencer Brown’s views: (I) Man’s perceptions are not bounded by organs of 
perception. He perceives more than sense (tho' ever so acute) can discover. (II) Reason or the ratio of all we have 
already known is not the same that it shall be when we know more.  
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organization studies, showing how such readings overflow the distinctions drawn in Laws of 
Form. Reading Spencer Brown not through the prism of mathematics, but as an evocative 
invitation to engage with the fissures that animate art and human life, highlights the paradoxical 
interplay of organization and violence; and how tragedy, suffering, sympathy and love should 
be more prominent in organizational research.   
 
Laws of Form and organization: Re-entry I 
Laws of Form responds to a long-standing mathematical paradox relating to infinite 
series of numbers. At the end of the nineteenth century, the founder of set theory, Georg Cantor, 
found that the infinite is itself differentiated, with different infinite series coming in different 
sizes. Moreover, if one counted all the infinite series, one would again find an infinite series, 
but one whose number, including itself when counted, must be larger than any countable 
(cardinal) number (Davis, 2000, p. 67). This problem led Russell to consider paradoxes in logic 
and the membership of sets: Extraordinary sets are self-including, such as ‘a set of all things 
not sparrows.’ This set itself also belongs to all things not being sparrows. Ordinary sets, on 
the other hand, have no such self-referentiality, for instance the set: ‘all things that are sparrow’ 
which, clearly, does not include the ‘set’ itself. But what about a set containing all ordinary 
sets? Would that not at once have to be larger than the number of all the sets it contains, as it, 
itself, is one such set (Davis, 2000, p. 67)? As Russell (1919, p. 136) states: 
 
The comprehensive class we are considering, which is to embrace everything, must embrace itself as one 
of its members. In other words, if there is such a thing as “everything,” then, “everything” is something, 
and is a member of the class “everything.” 
  
Whitehead and Russell’s (1910) Principia Mathematica proposes a stopgap 
intervention by excluding paradoxes from the domain of logic: sets cannot be members of 
themselves!7  
Spencer Brown’s biography placed him directly into this debate, having worked with 
the two foremost logicians of the time, Russell and Wittgenstein. His solution to the problem 
was formed when he worked on practical electrical and engineering assignments.8 
 
7 The continuation of the problem is most intriguing, as the proof of Cantor’s ideas leads via Kurt Gödel, who 
provided a theorem suggesting that any sufficiently complex mathematical system would contain undecidable 
propositions, including, with impish irony, the Principia Mathematica itself, to Alan Turing’s development of the 
universal computer as a brute force means of proof. 
8 He recounts this at a conference held at the Esalen Institute in California, organized to explore Laws of Form in 
a week-long meeting with the ‘master’, also attended by von Förster and Bateson. After only two days, Spencer 
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Collaborating with his brother David on transistor elements and, in the early 1960s, 
commissioned by British Rail, Spencer Brown developed a machine capable of calculating the 
movement of railway carriages in and out of tunnels. This required counting the wheels going 
inside, but also backwards, as trains frequently stop and reverse, while not forgetting how many 
wagons had passed in to the tunnel.9 It occurred to Spencer Brown (1973)  that logic based on 
such ‘and/or’, ‘if/so’, etc., rules was of little use for this task, as it was not a matter of defining 
and calculating truth values but of coping with states that change depending on circumstance 
and environment (Bakken, 2014). The calculation of railway carriages therefore entailed 
precisely the kind of vagueness that Russell sought to exclude from the domain of mathematics 
and logic.  
Laws of Form states such set-theoretical self-referentiality in arithmetic terms, before 
transposing the idea of imaginary numbers into Boolean algebra. It develops a calculus for 
seemingly inconsistent values: here the statement is true (we count the railway carriage), here 
it is not (it is the same one that reversed earlier): “It's either what it was before or it's what it 
wasn't before” (Spencer Brown, 1973). In solving the problem of counting railway carriages, 
almost as an afterthought, Laws of Form provides mathematicians and logicians with a method 
- a primary algebra - to work with self-referential ideas: ‘an engineering mathematics 
[enabling] engineers to construct machines that will do things’ (Heidingsfelder, 2013). 
Laws of Form develops a series elegant operations which, unlike those of formal logic, 
do not begin with elements, but with an act. Prompted by Spencer Brown’s injunction to ‘draw 
a distinction’: " ... a universe comes into being when a space is severed ... " (Spencer Brown, 
1969, p. xxix). This cleaving of a first space is akin to drawing a circle or box on a piece of 
paper. The act ‘shapes distinguishable states’ that allow for any distinction of some-thing from 
something else – and all subsequent descriptions - to be made. Distinction creates autonomous 
systems and their universes, held together ‘in perfect continence’;10 and once “the distinction 
has been drawn, a ‘universe’ is there, and the gates to return to a state of nothingness are 
closed…” (Schiltz, 2007, p. 13). 
 
Brown hurried back to England, having fallen out with the conference sponsors (Barney, 2019).  Baecker (1999) 
tells us that in this period Spencer Brown also sought the psychotherapeutic services of Ronald D. Laing.  
9 Rumour has it his brother never existed (Landini, 2018); that perhaps ‘David’ was merely a ‘tax avoidance 
construct’ (Beer, 2019). We looked for the patent Spencer Brown mentions in his talk, one for a firm called 
Mullard on lift design and one on board games – but both were filed under the single name George Spencer 
Brown. Yet, his autobiography contains pictures of both as children (Spencer-Brown, 2004. From around 1971 
he uses a hyphen in his name, but he also went by the names of Richard Leroy, Richard Revere and James 
Keys). 
10 It is this idea of cleaving and shaping of perfectly distinguished systems that underpins later notions of 
autopoiesis (https://www.jamesrwilliams.net/metaphysics-deleuze-or-spencer-brown/) 
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Spencer Brown draws a mark of distinction (the hook in Figure 1, suggesting a box or 
circle)11 separating an ‘inside’ (called the ‘marked state’; what is known) from an outside 
(‘unmarked state’; the unknown, contextual remainder). The whole set is called ‘the Form’; a 
triad consisting of the inside, outside as well as the (mark of) distinction itself, marking the 
boundary:12  
  
 
      Figure 1 
 
As the distinction is drawn (an ‘act’) , there “can be no distinction without motive, and 
there can be no motive unless contents are seen to differ in value” (Spencer Brown, 1969, p. 
1), the ensuing triadic form (inside/outside/mark) stands in a self-referential relationship: there 
are no factual sides without a distinction which involves indicating one (‘marked’) side of that 
distinction against another, unknown (‘unmarked) side. This is why Spencer Brown (1969, p. 
4) tells us to: ‘call the form of the first distinction the form’.  
Spencer Brown outlines two ‘primitive’ operational equations following two axioms. 
First, the ‘law of calling’ holds that ‘the value of a call (i.e., to name or mark a distinction) 
made again is the (same) value of the call’. This is akin to calling the same thing twice - but 
both things called are identical if they are not distinct (Neuman, 2003, p. 91). No matter how 
often we repeat this call, the named or marked value remains the same, so that applying the 
law of calling takes the form of condensation (i.e. the mark) as shown in figure 2:   
 
       =     . 
              Figure 2 
 
The second law is the form of ‘crossing’, holding that ‘the value of a crossing made 
again is not the value of the crossing’. Figure 3 shows that values of both intentions (crossing 
and re-crossing) together is the value indicated by none of them and, thus, a cancellation. Here, 
the outer mark serves as an operator in the interpretation: Operating on itself, it cancels itself, 
crossing from the marked state means entering the unmarked state (Kauffmann & Varela, 1980, 
p. 174). Another way of putting this is to say that a distinction (i.e. a differentiation) cannot 
 
11 This is similar to Peirce’s sign of illation, indicating an inference, for example in made-up words in Lewis 
Carroll’s poems, such as ‘slithy’ (lithe and slimy) or, more recently, ‘smog’ (smoke and fog) (See Kauffmann, 
n.d.) 
12 Many other distinctions are possible, e.g. finite/infinite or is/is not. See Herbst (1971, p. 89). 
Inside    Outside 
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itself be differentiated, as it is the most basic unit of analysis, for to do so ‘turns us back into 
the void… from distinctiveness to nothingness’ (Neuman, 2003, p. 92). Like the crossing of 
life into death operates on life, it cancels out what that life previously was. 
 
      = . 
    
            Figure 3 
 
These two equations represent the foundational states of observation that either 
condensates the form by repeating it or cancels the form by re-crossing it. Throughout Laws 
of Form, Spencer Brown demonstrates how any combination of marks – no matter how 
complex – can be reduced to either the mark (Fig. 2) or the no-mark (Fig. 3). 
Equipped with these two simple injunctions, Spencer-Brown and his brother had 
developed a machine to count train wheels going backwards and forwards in and out of 
tunnels. Placed at each end of a tunnel, they counted each train’s wheels, and if the count did 
not match an alarm would go of, thereby, preventing anything from entering the tunnel 
(Spencer-Brown in Barney, 2019, p.18). Throughout Laws of Form Spencer-Brown 
demonstrates how complex combinations of marks – which probably surpasses any daily 
routine of trains – can be reduced to either a mark (Fig. 2) or the no-mark (Fig. 3). We may 
count a wheel entering:  
                 .  
Now it rolls forth and back on the counter, so the same wheel is counted (perhaps over and 
over) again:    
                                                     =   .     
 
But then it reverses out of the tunnel:   
 
                                                 =       .     
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Next, the wheel rolls back into the tunnel again, and so forth, producing beautiful 
logical formations:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4  
 
These can be reduced (by means of cancellation and condensation) to   .   (one 
wheel has entered) which can be compared to the same calculation on the other end of the 
tunnel (see Spencer-Brown, 1973, p.18).  
However, it does not stop here. Spencer Brown also introduces us to the observer by 
allowing Laws of Form – the book itself – to question its own beginning (Spencer-Brown 
1973, p.68). Like sets that cannot be members of themselves, this self-referentiality creates its 
own paradoxical form; a re-entry  (dotted line in Fig. 5) in which the form (e.g. the book 
locating the origins of everything in distinctions) enters the form (as something that is itself a 
product of  distinctions):  
 
 
   
 
Figure 5 
 
This means that re-entries entail blind spots as no observer (be it a book or a person) 
can see their own observation. Baecker (2015) shows an organizational application of Spencer 
Brown’s concept of re-entry. Organizations not merely reproduce existing patterns and 
processes, but they continually engage in the evaluation, adjustment and alteration of what they 
are in relation to their environment. The task of management can be expressed as follows: 
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Management = Organization    Economy13 
 
   Figure 6 
  
The solid line is a ‘mark of distinction’ (cf. Fig. 1), indicating managers’ role in 
distinguishing outside (economy) and inside (organization). When making decisions, managers 
may treat the outside (unmarked state) as stable or unchanging. Baecker calls this a ‘heroic’ 
mode, as managers rely on their character, authority or on rational tools to commit to a decision 
without ambiguity or dithering. Such a decision may be reiterated in numerous strategy 
documents, but these do not add new meaning to this decision (Fig. 2). Such decisions fix the 
boundary between organization/economy and all the heroic manager can do is wait and see 
how things go in relation to the (unobserved) environment.  
A different, ‘post-heroic’ mode of managing would instead involve the continuous 
reconsideration of the ‘inside’ (the organization) in light of its relation to the outside (the 
economy). A post-heroic manager, perhaps not trusting what she14 sees, may speak to 
customers, study other industries, or read books, in order to reassess the organization-economy 
distinction. Indicated by Figure 3, the post-heroic manager may cancel or suspend any initial 
decision (taking time to look beyond the boundary of her organization) and draw a new 
distinction. But she can also start to reflect on her way of observing the organization and 
thereby ‘re-enter’ (Figure 6: dotted line) the organization. The paradoxical complexity of the 
post-heroic approach is easily veiled by the eloquent simplicity of Spencer Brown and 
Baecker’s depictions because, in order to make the world visible, the manager must do what is 
logically impossible: draw distinctions on the basis of the outcomes of these very distinctions. 
Here, management entails a self-referential and reflexive position. It is worth noting 
that to observe a distinction is something very different from drawing it: gaining oversight 
means suspending action; while acting means suspending oversight. Post-heroic management 
requires continuous relating of both sides (what is marked and what is unmarked) as well as 
considering the distinction itself: observer and observed are merely partial reflections of each 
other; the organization is at once the input variable (as belonging to the environment, qua 
 
13 Translated from Baecker (2015).  
14 Men can also be managers and don’t’ mind being called ‘she’, do they? See Spencer Brown’s (2004, p. 112) 
use of gender-specific pronouns. 
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distinction) as well as an output one (as something about what a decision is made): A ‘re-entry 
of the difference between organization and economy into the organization’ (Baecker, 2015, p. 
7). 
Baecker’s analysis provides an expandable application of Laws of Form to different 
contexts such as local, national and global economies. A second order observer (a higher 
ranked manager) may look at how the (first order) manager draws distinctions, while herself 
being observed by a third-level observer, and so on. Precisely because the post-heroic mode 
requires the continual adjustment of responses in light of feedback received from any 
distinction, it lacks the commitment, clarity and unambiguity of the heroic mode; but in return 
this brings contingency and the emancipatory potential that as something is done, 
simultaneously, something else becomes possible.  
 The paradoxical conundrum of the post-heroic manager who, somehow, has to be 
both inside and outside of the organization, can be expressed as a mathematical equation 
(Spencer Brown, 1979, p. xiv):  x2 = -1 which, transposed, gives: x = !"# .  However, these 
equations are transposed, they always lead to a self-referential statement in which ‘x’ is 
determined by a calculation that already involves ‘x’ which, similar to the manager, ends up 
on both sides of the equation. It is precisely this self-referentiality Russell disallowed (see 
also Baecker, 2015a). But rather than treating this as a question of abstract logic, Spencer 
Brown (1969, p. 98), describes a series of infinite (‘subversive’) steps where ‘x’ remains on 
both sides of the equation. He invites us to simply insert the (self-referential) value of ‘x’ 
(which is !"#  ) whenever we would encounter ‘x’ – thus following the recurring cycles into 
infinity: 𝑥 = 	 !"(#)&	 !"($)&	 !"($)&	!"($)																….         
 
Here, the unknown part simply ‘re-enters’ (is copied into) the equation, resembling not 
finite Russellian logic, but cycles of computer switches and railway carriages which can be 
subjected to Turing machine execution of operations that brush against infinity.  
  
… in respect of its own information, the universe must expand to escape the telescopes through which 
we, who are it, are trying to capture it, which is us. The snake eats itself, the dog chases its tail (Spencer 
Brown, 1969, p. 106).  
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But just like Spencer Brown’s ‘solution’ to “x2 = -1” represents endless cycles, the post-
heroic manager finds herself in an endless regress; all of which can now be elegantly depicted 
in staggered marks of distinctions and re-entries (see Baecker, 2006 for a fuller example of 
organizations nested in environments). This is the same as suggesting that the post-heroic 
management problem is a potentially infinite line of oscillating responses: now organization, 
now environment, now organization, and so on. 
Spencer Brown’s imaginary process therefore introduces the element of time into logic 
(Wille, 2009, p. 175ff) or, rather, it creates time as soon as this oscillation of states is measured 
(Spencer Brown, 1973; 1969, p. 75). The question is suddenly no longer whether the right or 
wrong (heroic) decision is taken, but rather how managers can pursue these potentially infinite 
series, day in and day out, year after year. What may appear as a paradox when merely looked 
at statically loses its paradoxical quality thr 
ough the addition of time (Bateson, 1991, p. 181; Kauffmann, 2016, p. 270) in which 
computational functions of infinite cycles can unfold. 
 
All is Nothing: Re-entry II 
While Laws of Form emphasizes the creative potential of drawing distinctions, it is 
not radically constructionist in suggesting observers can draw any distinction. The scope of 
possible distinctions depends upon another, more primordial context: a medium15 providing 
the conditions of possibility for all following forms. Even a rule, to be followed, requires the 
medium of a voice or a ‘flat piece of paper’ on which distinctions can be recorded:  
 
The fact that men [sic.] have for centuries used a plane surface for writing means that, at this point in 
the text, both author and reader are ready to be conned into the assumption of a plane writing surface 
without question. But, like any other assumption, it is not unquestionable, and the fact that we can 
question it here means that we can question it elsewhere… Moreover, it is now evident that if a 
different surface is used, what is written on it, although identical in marking, may be not identical in 
meaning (Spencer Brown, 1979, p. 70).  
 
 
15 While a medium gives always possibilities for more than just one single form to occur (e.g. the media of money 
and power giving rise to economy and politics, as in Parson’s (1977) theory of generalized symbolic media), it 
still delimits the range of possible forms. Luhmann (1997: 198)  media as loosely coupled elements, brought into 
a stricter coupling through forms; a specific form of selection within a medium, e.g. language as medium for 
words, or words as medium for a poem.  
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The paper on which the mathematician draws her first line provides the space that is severed 
or cloven; the medium from which certain forms can be selected (Bakken, 2014, p. 496). 
Spencer Brown shows us that a flat sheet of paper allows different forms than a torus; in the 
same way in the media of management, leadership, and organization each limiting the scope 
of possible distinctions (organization/economy; organization/society; operations/industry) 
(Heider, 1959/1926). 
But the medium is not really where it all begins. At the very beginning of Laws of 
Form (itself already a medium), before we encounter injunctions, spaces or even mention of 
paper, we find a series of symbols from Lao-tse’s Daodejing which translate into: Wu 
(nothing) ming (name) tian (heaven) di (earth) zhi (from) shi (beginning) (Wille 2009, p. 64). 
Earth and sky emerging out of nothing, or as in von Förster’s (2014, p. 5) interpretation: ‘the 
beginning of heaven and earth has no name.’ In a similar way, the bible, Genesis, 1: 2 tells us 
that ‘Now the earth was formless and empty’ and even Hesiod’s Theogony, spelling out the 
coming into being of cosmos, lets the muses sing that ‘In truth, first of all Chasm came to 
be’; a gap or opening from which earth and sky, day and night, mortals and immortals 
emerge (Hesiod, 2006, p. 13). Exactly, in this point lies the radicality of Spencer Brown’s 
claims: Only what is first distinguished is; and ‘all this’ – including infinity (see Spencer 
Brown, 1995, p. 128) - merely follows once it is distinguished against the nothing. In the 
introduction to the German translation of Only Two, Spencer Brown (1994, p. 11) remarks:  
 
…the only »thing« (i.e. nonthing) that would be sensitive enough to be influenced by a stimulus so weak 
that it didn’t exist, was nothing itself. That is, nothing is the only »thing« that is so unstable that it can 
»go off« of its own accord, the only »thing« sensitive enough to be changed by nothing.  So, if nothing 
could change nothing, we have, inevitably, the appearance of a first distinction, and the rest, including 
the ineluctable appearance of »all this«, inevitably follows.   
  
Spencer Brown’s poetry and stories convey the qualities of an originary, formless 
nothing out of which any first distinction and all forms can emerge. They are based on his 
broad engagement beyond mathematics, with (especially Eastern) philosophy, psychoanalysis 
and art. To trace these wider ideas, and to prepare us for an interpretation of his poetry and 
stories, we turn to the elaboration of the nothing in these areas, beginning with what the 
Japanese philosopher Keiji Nishitani calls ‘selfness’: 
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… a self that emerges into its nature where each and every thing is in itself and at its own ground 
(whereby fire is fire because it does not burn itself, the willow is green because it is not green, and time 
is time because it is not time) and is at one … with all of them  (Nishitani, 1982, p. 257). 
  
Fire cannot burn fire; having to reach out of its self-enclosure into the surrounding field 
and so become fire only in its encounter with combustible and other elements: with all things 
not itself. And so all objects can only be constituted in the negative, against their ‘universal 
remainder’, through the difference between themselves and their surrounding field (Bryson, 
1988, p. 98). This universal remainder is a point of ‘absolute nonobjectifiability’ (Nishitani, 
1982, p. 188) prior to all reason and logos; before any medium, even before time or space, has 
to be a differentiation that brings them into being (Spencer Brown, 1973). Nishitani, says: 
  
Take the tiny flower blooming away out in my garden. It grew from a single seed and will one day return 
to the earth, never again to return so long as this world exists. Yet we do not know where its pretty little 
face appeared from nor where it will disappear to. Behind it lies absolute nihility: the same nihility that 
lies behind us, the same nihility that lies in the space between flowers and men. Separated from me by 
the abyss of that nihility, the flower in my garden is an unknown entity (Nishitani, 1982, p. 101). 
  
  Never a thing in its own right, the flower exists as trans-formation from seed to blossom 
to dust as an ‘inclusive generic space’; without ever appearing in itself. Always on the move, 
any pre-sence merely indicates immanent yet ungraspable absence brimming with potential, 
yet  forever beyond, and yet within, all the forms and objects that make up our visible, positive 
world (Cooper, 2006, p. 63). And just like the flower, the human body ‘is not a thing or 
substance, given, but a continuous creation’ (Brown, 1966, p. 155) of form out of raw matter 
(Cooper, 2009, p. 243). This nothingness, this formless mess, is always here, even though it 
can never be observed. The flower is already dust; human existence already non-existence; any 
form (this blooming flower on that field; that human being, there, smiling) is always only one 
of the  ‘multiple presences that constitute the being of everyday life’: one form (a trans-form) 
appearing qua the ongoing human act of creation, out of here-yet-absent void (Cooper, 2006, 
p. 61). The blooming flower calls forth the seed from whence it emerged and the dust into 
which it will inevitably turn, and so the flower is never fully present or absent, but ‘forever 
suspended between the two’ (Cooper, 2006, p. 66). Birth 
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... throws the human body into an invisibility of unmarked space [where] the body … founds and finds 
itself through a primal act of division which engenders the self as a collection of organs – eyes, hands, 
brain, nerves, etc. – that actively work on the physical matter of the world (Cooper, 2006, p. 64).  
 
 This primal division is a cut, an act of violence or accident, opening up an agonistic 
field that throws human existence into a ‘continuous process of founding and finding, re-
founding and re-finding oneself in a world motivated by incompleteness, decay and 
disappearance’ (Cooper, 2006, p. 61). Human organization is the ‘relentless praxis of process 
in pursuit of itself’, beginning in indefinition and lacking perceptual clarity, striving to create 
a meaningful world of forms out of this structural absence (Cooper, 2007, p. 1547). 
Here we find a different kind of re-entry: Not dependent on observers or endless 
oscillation, Spencer Brown’s poetry and stories point towards a unity behind any medium. Just 
like actual keys lose their singularity the moment they enter and dissolve into their locking 
mechanism, the well-chosen nom de plume ‘Keys’ (sexual motifs aside) signifies its difference 
and simultaneous belonging of something and nothing. As cultural techniques, keys also open 
doors that separate one system from another, unlocking Laws of Form through Only Two’s 
poetry and psychoanalytical tangles. Spencer Brown (1971, p. 110) sees Laws of Form and 
Only Two, ‘in some respects [as] companion volumes.’ He later adds his (supposed) children’s 
book ‘A Lion’s Teeth’ (Spencer Brown, 1995, p. 22), referring to his ‘Trilogy’. Speaking as 
Keys (1971, p. 83), he remarks: 
 
There is a game children play with the tide is coming in, surrounding themselves with an ‘impenetrable’ 
wall of sand, keeping the water out as long as possible … Adults play a similar game, surrounding 
themselves with an ‘impenetrable’ wall of arguments to keep out reality. 
 
The reality is that all is nothing; and precisely this insight must be locked out by means 
of logic and argument. But, like water, reality breaks in, ‘flooding us out’ when we have 
overdrawing our boundaries. Keys (1971, p. 89) rants about expert, professions, personalities, 
identities, and specialists, especially the ‘qualified people’ who ‘sneer, sneer, sneer, cut, cut, 
cut everyone else down to their size’, a cutting and dividing that ends in the ‘final indignity’ of 
giving the part precedence over the whole. A whole that increasingly covered up under thicker 
and thicker layers of language, theory, doctrine, fashions, ideals, politics, religion, 
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respectability, decency and humanity’ by identities that ‘cripple’ people ‘so that they will be 
incapable of doing anything else (Keys, 1971, p. 95; 120).16 
 
All is and is not Nothing 
That all comes from (is) nothing – and therefore always stands in relation to (is 
distinguished from) nothing brings us back to the paradox of Only Two can Play this Game17: 
How can two individuals stay together for extended times, sometimes their entire adult lives, 
as a unit? What, in other words, is the medium of human life so it unfolds as a play of unity 
and difference? Following Spencer Brown into psychoanalysis will provide us with further 
clues as to the qualities of such a unity. Carl Gustav Jung’s (1916) Seven Sermons of Death 
state: 
  
Hear Ye: I begin with nothing. Nothing is the same as fullness. In the endless state fullness is the same 
as emptiness. The Nothing is both empty and full. One may just as well state some other thing about the 
Nothing, namely that it is white or that it is black or that it exists or that it exists not. That which is 
endless and eternal has no qualities, because it has all qualities. 
  
Jung names this endless and external domain Pleroma; a world without distinctions that 
can neither be grasped or even thought about. Opposed to the Pleroma stands the Creatura, the 
world of living things; a world, inter alia, for human beings. We live because our “…essence 
is differentiation … [of] individual qualities … we die to the extent that we fail to discriminate. 
The differentiations arising from the Pleroma come in pairs: all and nothing, the effective and 
ineffective, the living and the dead, light and dark, hot and cold, good and evil. The Pleroma 
holds both sides of distinctions and because they continually cancel each other out, the Pleroma 
is indeed all and nothing.  
The Creatura, the world of living things, is essentially removed from the Pleroma. As 
mortals, we are bounded in time and space, while such properties, as any bounded 
characteristics, are alien to the Pleroma. In the Creatura, that is in us, these distinctions are 
differentiated: We see light or dark, we embrace the living or we demure before death, we are 
hot or cold, we applaud the good or condemn evil. In us there is no cancelling out. In holding 
 
16 For similar notes on scientists see Spencer Brown, 2004: 33,39,110,112.  
17 The book elaborates the marriage of man and woman (an institution the author says he does not much believe 
in), but its insights can be extended to include same-sex relationships. This itself is perhaps its most profound 
insight:  that things could be otherwise and that any distinction, especially those so taken for granted, were once 
drawn; they required an act, and so they can be redrawn as well (see also Luhmann, 1988). 
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these distinctions open, we live. Being alive means drawing and seeing distinctions. Life is a 
tension or span; an open wound afflicted by the accident of birth, pulsating, seeping, festering 
and seeking closure in the healing that is death; that is when the Creatura with all its 
distinctions, dissolves once again in the eternity of indifference that is the Pleroma. The 
accident of life is therefore that we perceive the world only ever as one end of these distinctions: 
all, effective, living, light, hot or good. Nothing, ineffective, dead, dark, cold or evil: 
  
When we strive for the good and the beautiful, we thereby forget about our essential being, which is 
differentiation, and we are victimized by the qualities of the Pleroma which are the pairs of opposites. 
We strive to attain to the good and the beautiful, but at the same time we also attain to the evil and the 
ugly, because in the Pleroma these are identical with the good and the beautiful (Jung, 1916, p. 47). 
  
The Pleroma, whilst inaccessible to the Creatura, still holds its cancelling-out sway 
over us. To be born is to begin the process of dying in the same pattern in which the heat of 
spring already beckons the cold of winter; the good deed stands out against a background of 
evil and apathy; and the way in which the infusion of energy into a part of any closed system 
begins a process of exchange towards entropic equality (Bateson, 1972, p. 463). The 
differences and distinctions that animate the world of living things are therefore always 
temporal and fleeting; only holding up in the struggle for life until, eventually and inevitably, 
life exhausts; and with the last breath of the living-dying being all distinctions, all striving and 
willing, and all possible paradoxes which span between those poles, again come to rest in their 
natural, cancelled out state. Such is the infinity of the Pleroma: a state in which all distinctions 
are cancelled out. 
  
I tell you: one must have chaos in one… 
Jung held seminars on Nietzsche in 1934, followed by more intense readings 
throughout the isolated years of the war. In 1872, Nietzsche had published his first work, The 
Birth of Tragedy, breaking with the tedium of philology to produce a philosophical treatise in 
a new style of writing, questioning and expressive of emotions and drives rather than 
analytically demure: Why we are so incapable of joy in the face of the fleeting, the transitory, 
the fugitive and mortal? Is not the very mutable perishability of human life is to be 
commended? In the introduction, Nietzsche tells us that it is: 
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… the continuous evolution of art is bound up with the duality of the Apolline and the Dionysiac in much 
the same way as reproduction depends on there being two sexes which co-exist in a state of perpetual 
conflict interrupted only occasionally by periods of reconciliation (Nietzsche, 1872, p. 14). 
  
Apollo, god of image-making sculptors, of dream and light, pleasure and beauty, and 
Dionysus, patron of imageless music, intoxication, song and dance, form a reciprocal bi-polar 
necessity: Sublime Apolline beauty set against the ground from which it gains its levity. The 
sculpture carves the individuating boundaries, the images that make the self, so that it can first 
know it-self, against a drunken world of contour-free boundary-crossing that destroys the 
barriers and limits of existence; a world of excess and getting above oneself; and of imageless, 
primal pain (Girard, 1972, p. 125). Ancient vases depict these in-between qualities, showing 
Dionysus’s followers with half-human, half-animal bodies; Dionysus himself, originally a 
fertility god in form of a bull or goat, is drawn in a soft and feminine human shape (Nussbaum 
& Sihvola, 2002, p. 18).  
Feminine-masculine, titanic-barbaric, shepherd-satyr: oppositions opening up a cleft 
into which art and human existence are born. The Dionysian is a terrifying world without 
meaning from which the Apollonian form offers aesthetic salvation through form, beauty, and 
visual imagery (Nussbaum & Shivola, 2002, p. 18). Neither art nor life flourishes in either 
domain alone: the Dionysian too terrifying, the Apollonian too unnourishing, too aloof to 
maintain connection with the world. The Apollonian restrains but never eliminates the 
exuberance of the Dionysian, releasing joy and terror; fear and hope; order and chaos – and so 
Nietzsche’s (1885, p. 9) Zarathustra speaks: “one must have chaos in one, to give birth to a 
dancing star”. 
  Having chaos in you means leaving the middle to embrace both the sublime and the 
terrifying, and to do so without flinching or wavering. This is the birth of true art, which began 
with the invention of the Greek epic as a move from successive shifts between Apollonian 
tragedies and the debaucheries of the orgiastic festival towards integration. The epic foists these 
oppositions upon audiences caught in the curious paradox of being joyful spectators to the 
horrors unfolding before them on stage, seeing: “the tragic hero before [them], in epic clearness 
and beauty, and nevertheless [rejoicing] in his annihilation” (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 22). Nietzsche 
was enraptured by the composer Richard Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk, beguiled by its capacity 
to shake ‘mankind to its deepest foundations’: 
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…music speaks from the depths of this heart; countless appearances like this could pass before the same 
music, yet they would never exhaust its essence, but would for ever remain mere externalized copies of 
it (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 103) 
  
In Wagner’s operas, the form of the actor, that Apollonian individuation, remains mere 
appearance; an ‘isolated, shadowy image’; a soothing balm set against the archaic, primal, cruel 
barbarous and bestial (Eagleton, 2003, p. 53). Tristan und Isolde lets the audience ‘see before 
[them], in sensuously visible form … the undulations of the Will, the conflict of motives, the 
swelling current of passions, and as if they could dive down into the most delicate secrets of 
unconscious stirrings’ (Nietzsche, 1872, p. 104). This stirring is not the same as the artistic 
effect produced by the sculptor, and the ‘will-less’ clarity and beauty of the tragic hero, but the 
destruction of that form, so that through that form, in the moment of its destructive negation, 
its sinking, the Dionystic wisdom is given voice. Nietzsche (1872, p. 105) quotes Isolde’s final 
lines in ‘Liebestod’ (love-death): 
  
To drown us – sink down thus – 
all thought gone – delight alone 
  
Nietzsche’s original insight is this radical reversal: That the joy the tragedy stirs in the 
audience is not merely some ennobling, cathartic, or masochistic response (Price, 1998, p. 388), 
but when Dionystic drive ‘consumes the entire world of appearances,’ we can sense ‘behind 
that world and through its destruction, a supreme, artistic, primal joy in the womb of Primordial 
Unity’ (Nietzsche, 1872, p. 105). No longer a source of grief alone, the tragedy of the music 
drama brings this realm into a shimmering presence: “Dionysian impulse discharging itself in 
Apollonian imagery” (Eagleton, 2003, p. 56).  
Jung’s Sermons are set against this primordial unity. The images of the Creatura and 
their negation in the shadows of the Pleroma let an ungraspable, imageless and distinction-less 
world flicker and so announces our unity with nature; the reunification of spirit and body; joy 
and sorrow; what is good with what is most terrible; creation with destruction.This is the source 
of life, personality, vigour, will: the ‘spark of opposites’ creating life and determining being in 
the conscious and unconscious (Huskinson, 2004, p. 35; 95): 
  
The Pleroma possesses all: differentiation and non-differentiation. Differentiation is creation. The 
created wor
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reason the created also causes further differentiation. That is why man himself is a divider, inasmuch as 
his essence is also differentiation (Jung, 1982/1916, p. 46). 
  
Re-entry into Organization Studies 
 James Keys, with whom we began, names birth the ‘serious accident’. Natality invokes 
mortality; “[l]ife and death [are] equated: every coitus [repeats] the fall; brings death, birth, 
into the world” (Brown, 1966, p. 48). In addition to its sheer accidental contingency, birth 
carries the tragic inevitability of death in the same paradoxical way in which the unity of a 
relationship carries the spectre of loneliness, requiring neither fate, reason, justice, providence, 
the gods nor any other, external point. The accident is already there and even the most stable 
and peaceful period in life is merely a transition; what something is, is merely a veil for its true 
being: its mortality and decay: all that is, is indeed nothing. The Dionysian intuition, that 
‘cauldron of seething excitement’, is the psychoanalytical id standing against an essentially 
passive ego (Brown, 1966, p. 88); the individual or society made up of forces that are 
disruptive, destructive, and uncivil (Eagleton, 2003, p. 144).  
Spencer Brown (1995, p. 36) tells the story of ‘A Little Spider’ spinning her morning 
web in an arch between trees. With a blow of the wind, she throws her first horizontal thread 
then, ‘moving in and out from the frame to the centre of the web and back again … joining 
them all together with a fine spiral thread’. But as soon as she has finished, the protruding 
fishing rods carried by two boys along the forest path snap the web, leaving her ‘in ruins.’ The 
spider restarts her labour, finishing just before dusk, just when the boys return from fishing, 
again snapping her construction. The next morning the spider rebuilds her web, only for the 
previous day’s events to recur, leaving her fatigued and starving. On day three, the spider 
despairs, ‘for she knew now that these terrible punishments were coming to her because of 
some dreadful fault in her character… vowing to be a better spider in the future.’ In exhausted, 
feverish frenzy, she completes the finest and most elegant web, shining like silver in the sun, 
making her envious spider friends proclaim: 
 
 My, my! I’d give my life to be able to spin a web like that!  
 But the little spider wasn’t listening. She was dead. 
 
 The fable’s endless symbolism (Spencer Brown, 1995, p. 80) readily speaks to the 
problems of management: The spider’s predicament arises out of her awe-inspiring ‘heroic’ 
(Baecker, 2015) character, assuming a causality of events leading to the three-fold destruction 
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of the net that places her at the centre of ‘these terrible punishments’. This ‘sanity of identity’ 
(March, 2013, p. 206) ascribes to the spider the all too human need to comprehend the world 
by being ‘able to calculate it [through] constant causes; [ and] because we find no such constant 
causes in actuality, we invent them for ourselves’ (Nietzsche, 1967, p. 334). The invention of 
causes is akin to erecting the impenetrable wall that keeps out reality, for reality is the infinite, 
invisible and mute ground of mutability, which is intrinsically unlocatable. Nietzsche’s 
‘causes’ and Keys’s ‘sandy walls’ indicate this violent catachresis, the perversion of applying 
tokens and expressions to a ‘substratum’ that it does not properly denote: the severance of the 
undivided wholeness of the world; a ‘participal act’ of the world cutting itself into two in order 
to see itself as part and whole (Spencer Brown, 1971, p. 105; Cooper, 2013 604).  
In mistaking the part for the whole, we find not understanding but rather self-blaming, 
exhaustion, excessive efforts and the spider’s ultimate death. Her wisdom extends to weaving 
patterns from nothing, picking suitable trees and exploiting favourable gusts of wind, but not 
to the paths of humans and weekly rhythms which sees the two boys return to school, instead 
of going fishing, on the third day. These wider patterns can only become apparent through 
Spencer Brown’s voice as a distanced narrator who can distinguish human paths from forests, 
weekdays from weekends, educational and recreational practices, and much beyond. And only 
a (second order) reader of Spencer Brown’s stories can judge the author to be a strong 
mathematician or a poor poet, invoking distinctions of scholarly excellence and writerly 
traditions, and much beyond; all in the tradition of the ‘expert’ whom Spencer Brown (as Keys) 
so virulently detests.  
 
Re-entry II: Participation in the Nothing of It All 
Yet, there is more. In their reflections on paradox, Schad et al., (2016, p. 36) invoke the 
‘unity of opposites’, where things cannot exist without their counterparts, meaning paradoxes 
must equally exist as unified wholes. Baecker’s (2015) reading of Spencer Brown apprehends 
a unity of opposites through oscillating re-entries.  
  But Spencer Brown’s fable does not end here; it ends with the spider’s death following 
exhaustion, and thus with the relationship between organizing, suffering and mortality. It ends 
with the ultimate emptiness (Nishitani, 1982) that forms a constitutive negativity, a unified 
whole which, as death, remains intrinsically unlocatable. Rather than moving outwards, from 
observer to observer, this movement goes inwards; far deeper than the elegant expressions of 
Laws of Form, towards the fleeting, transitory, fugitive and mortal; towards the ‘primordial 
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unity’ (Nietzsche, 1872, p. 105) where even death, ‘as death’, vanishes into a wholeness which 
is ‘more than sense (tho' ever so acute) can discover’ (Blake, 2007, p. 57).  
Here we see why Spencer Brown turns from logic to poetry and stories – because the 
deepest space is not yet reached by the greatest number of inwards crossings of complex nets 
of distinctions (Spencer Brown 1973, p.40). Becoming audience to the spider’s plight, we are 
not merely distant observers, but part of the tragic spectacle in the sense of theoria, of being 
‘totally involved in and carried away by what one sees’ (Gadamer, 1975, p. 127). ‘The paradox 
unique to art’, Luhmann (2000, p. 149; 141) argues, ‘resides in the observability of the 
unobservable’ by ‘integrating what is in principle incommunicable’. And in so being carried 
away by poetry, stories or tragedies, the ‘mute field of mutability’ (Cooper, 2013, p. 588), 
begins to speak to us not in the language of causes and objects, but wholeness, by ‘giving 
oneself in self-forgetfulness to what one is watching’ (Gadamer, 1975, p. 128). Just like fire 
has to reach out of its self-enclosure, the spider reaches out into the surrounding field, and we 
marvel at the ‘graceful’ (Bateson, 1972, p. 108) participative extension of the spider’s deferred 
relationship between intestinal organization and a web that catches and stores its food.  
Against the zero-ground of the unified whole all things are constituted in partial 
relations. Just as fire reaches out into its other, organization carves order, forms and meanings 
disorder (Cooper, 2013, p. 599); while economy reaches out to contain the violence of its 
environment with its disembodied and seemingly neutral functions of industry, commerce  and 
markets, forming a bulwark against the arbitrary and naked mob violence of the riot and ‘panic’ 
of a Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’. But in containing the contagion of violent passions 
within the belief in the invisible mechanisms bestowing equilibrium and optimality, economy 
also comes to ‘contain’, that is include another, banal form of institutionalised violence that 
corrupts our moral sentiments by justifying suffering in the name of an abstract and invisible 
logic of the market (Dupuy, 2014, p. 30, c.f. Bateson, 1972, p. 489). 
Not by accident are the production lines of automated manufacture rooted in the the 
abattoir. Distinguished merely in the direction of flow, one assembles, the other disassembles 
bodies (Burrell, 1997, p. 144). This paradox can only be grasped when setting the very 
distinction between organization and its environment, or the spider-web complex and the trees, 
forest paths and human practices, the organization and its other, against the pleromatic ground, 
indicated by the nothing in which all distinctions disappear. Our sympathy in the unfolding 
tragedy of the spider’s labouring on her shiny web moves us beyond causalities by appreciating 
participation itself as the ‘highest manner of being human’ (Gadamer, 1975, p. 470). In 
sympathy, we glimpse the fable’s paradox of the double role of organizing in ensuring survival 
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whilst invoking suffering, the tragic expression of the torments, pity and fear that accompany 
the passages from birth to self to death (Jung, 1916, p. 57). In sympathy, we may begin to draw 
peripheral connections, for instance how the fabrication of ‘shiny’ consumer goods brings 
regular wages and reliable commerce while forcing slave-workers and child-labourers to weave 
their threads in clothing factories, joining the countless other victims of organized exploitation, 
including animals and the natural environment. Understanding wholeness not merely as the 
unity between two opposites, but as the zero-ground against which anything that ‘is’ spans 
paradoxical relations: Life to death; economy to violence; organization to disorganization: ‘… 
to be at one with all nature’ (Spencer-Brown, 2004, p.100).  
The location of the unified whole in the nothing also beckons the possibility of the 
absence of these couplets and paradoxes. The reckonings of generational inequalities, 
algorithmic simulations of realties or the progression of the effects of climate change are issues 
that not merely require re-entries into extant distinctions but the reimagination of human life 
in their absence: be that as shrivelled existences reduced to bare biological life, when states of 
exception become permanent, or when there is no memory of distinctions that can be re-
entered. We can already glimpse such possibilities in outbreaks, such as the current COVID19, 
which are so severe they threaten the very existence of our communities (Girard, 1972, p. 134). 
Here, the very ground, the medium from which distinctions can be cleaved is at stake because 
the organization of global commerce, travel and world-wide logistics also create the perfect 
conditions for viral contagion, together with the plastics and metals on whose surfaces droplets 
can survive, or factories so loud,  workers have to shout into each other’s faces. But also our 
social gathering, touching, and kissing, our eating and drinking, in short all the conventions 
that make us modern social beings, also invite the virus to leap from animals to humans, to be 
preserved by movements of goods and people faster than liquid can dry, and so befall 
populations made overweight and ill through the outsourcing of physical activity to machines 
and calorific excesses of processed foods. The human condition has turned, to borrow Serres’s 
(1982) term, from parasites to being hosts to a virus that feeds off the very things that make us 
who we are. The fragility of our condition is no longer merely a matter of organized work set 
against economic turmoil; school calendars against vacations; or healthcare set against ageing 
populations, but the very existential questions of whether we can still be at home in our world 
when we are isolated, fearful and alone. To which extent are we alive when we are hooked up 
to medical apparatuses? Are there differences in the suffering or in death, say between those 
infected with the virus and those from poverty and economic hardship as a result of lockdowns; 
or those driven to suicide for lack of support or human contact; or those whose medical 
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treatments for other conditions have been suspended? And is it still possible to love when every 
other is a potential source of infection or a competitor in the global race to vaccine dominance?   
Where all distinctions blur, we need to be much more cautious about the all too lofty, 
clear and heroic elements of research; those that cast the ‘world as re-presentation, as 
semblance; cast, like a Greek hymn, a ‘pure, unclouded sun-eye’” (Nietzsche, 1872, p. 36). To 
all this, the question of paradoxes is central, as it not just points at the juxtaposition of 
incommensurable dimensions, but also to the very act of the identification of any difference in 
the first place. This is the accident of which Keys speaks, and it is the purpose of mathematics, 
psychoanalysis, poetry and stories to indicate the unity not just of either side of a distinction, 
but of the very distinction with indistinctive totality, as such.  
Spencer Brown’s contribution to organizational paradoxes thus lies in his way of going 
deep into the paradox; behind the form and its distinctions, behind the medium, and into 
nothingness. Showing how everything is created out of nothing urges us to accept and live with 
this (ever present) absence. This does not mean that we should simply get lost in indifference 
or withdraw from the world but recognize the vast and radical possibilities of actively and 
creatively producing distinctions set against the nothing (Frambach, 2003, p. 119). As Keys 
(1971, p. 14) tells us: ‘There really is nothing to prevent us from rewriting the stage-directions’ 
and so why do we, as students of organization, do so little of this? Keys’s antagonism towards 
experts, identities, and professions, borne out of the limitedness of Apollonian forms, seems to 
also pertain to our efforts. Eagleton scathingly puts it thus: 
 
As we witness the detestable emergence for ‘theoretical man’, the exultant aesthetic spectator yields 
ground to the joyless academic eunuch, with his pathetic illusion that thought can penetrate and even 
correct Being (Eagleton, 2003, p. 18). 
 
There is very little tragedy, or suffering, or love in organizational research; neither do 
we find drunkenness, humour or eroticism. For us, these become mere externalities, things to 
be studied. Yet those are the means by which one of the foremost logicians and mathematicians 
seeks understanding and through the trilogy of it all, Spencer Brown shows us their analytical 
value: 
 
        Only two 
Can play  
This game 
One can 
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Play it 
Just the same 
None 
Can play it 
Otherwise 
Minus one’s 
The one 
That dies 
      (Keys, 1971, p. 69) 
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